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and excessive government power, he can go no further before remarking “that if,
among so many pathologies, twentieth-century Europe has left any decent legacy to
the future, the ‘mixed system’ and the welfare state are certainly the more humane and
compassionate of them” (p. 237). Quite so. It made me reºect that what is most nota-
bly absent in this lively book is a study of the proselytization of an American eco-
nomic philosophy designed to exalt a particular model of American society and to be-
atify its preachers. In bringing simpletons to power in the Soviet Union, this served
the interests of the United States and perhaps the “West” much more successfully than
did any form of the Christian religion, but its tendency to increase the inºuence of
similar simpletons throughout Europe may not serve either side of the Atlantic so
well.
✣ ✣ ✣
Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria,
1955–1957, trans. by Robert L. Miller. New York: Enigma Books, 2002. 185 pp.
$25.00.
Reviewed by Daniel Moran, Naval Postgraduate School
In 1957, French soldiers tortured approximately 40 percent of the male population of
the Muslim quarter of Algiers to try to root out the terrorist network of the Algerian
National Liberation Front (known to history as the FLN). This campaign, although
shadowy and shrouded in euphemism, was not, strictly speaking, secret. Systematic
torture in Algeria was the subject of widespread public comment at the time—one
French general was relieved of his command after condemning it in the press—and it
has attracted a good deal of scholarly investigation since. Several major participants,
including the commanding ofªcer in Algiers, General Jacques Massu, have written
about it, for the most part unapologetically. Their frankness has been facilitated by the
blanket amnesty issued by the French government in 1968, absolving all those who
served in Algeria of whatever crimes they may have committed there.
Among professional scholars, the notion that widespread torture occurred during
the Algerian War is no more controversial than the notion that Japanese troops bru-
tally occupied China in the 1930s and 1940s or that Turks massacred Armenians dur-
ing and immediately after World War I. But in the same way that the “rape of Nan-
king” and the slaughter of Armenians are still glossed over in current-day Japan and
Turkey, so public consciousness in France of this dark passage in the nation’s history
has been distorted by systematic obfuscation and denial on the part of the govern-
ment, with the perhaps predictable result, in the French case, that whenever the
ofªcially applied bandage is torn off the wound the bleeding and weeping are profuse.
How else can one explain the extraordinary indignation that has greeted the ap-
pearance of Paul Aussaresses’s memoir The Battle of the Casbah? By any reckoning it
tells a familiar story, albeit from an unusual point of view. Aussaresses, an intelligence
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ofªcer on General Massu’s staff, was personally responsible for the torture and execu-
tion of dozens of suspects, including several senior ªgures whose deaths have long
been ofªcially ascribed to suicide. Aussaresses’s book is undoubtedly the most hands-
on account of the so-called “Battle of Algiers” to have made it into mainstream print,
and its effect on French opinion has been galvanic. Amid much uproar, Aussaresses,
his publisher, and his editor have all been tried, convicted, and ªned on charges of
complicity in justifying war crimes—evidently a crime in France, even if having per-
petrated them is not. Aussaresses, who retired as a general, has also been forbidden to
wear his uniform and was suspended from membership in the Legion d’Honneur at the
demand of President Jacques Chirac (who, like Aussaresses, served in Algeria as a cap-
tain). But Chirac’s government has rejected demands from human rights organiza-
tions that Aussaresses be tried under international law for crimes against humanity, on
the grounds that such a proceeding would abridge French sovereignty.
The most disconcerting feature of Aussaresses’s account is undoubtedly its tone,
which not only is unabashed but incorporates a ªne shading of Gallic sangfroid that
does get under the skin, even if you know what lies ahead. This is the story of a ªt, in-
telligent young man doing hard but important work in interesting places, a young
man who parachutes for relaxation on the weekends. The story is replete with in-
vented dialogue and unconvincing scenes in which the hero shouts down his com-
manding ofªcers, slaps and humiliates underlings, and generally behaves like a charac-
ter in the novels of Jean Lartéguy. Aussaresses’s most sensational factual claim—that
the notorious Casbah bomber Ali-la-Pointe was betrayed to the French by the leader
of the Algiers rebellion, Saadi Yacef—has (unsurprisingly) been denied by Yacef him-
self. Absent some sort of corroborating evidence, the issue must remain unresolved.
The book’s value as a source on the Algerian war is therefore limited, though it is
worth the attention of those who study how torture and atrocity are remembered by
the perpetrators. The Battle of the Casbah has the merit of emphasizing that French
torture was indeed terrible. Jacques Massu famously declared in his memoirs, La vraie
bataille d’Alger (Paris: Plon, 1971), that on one occasion he had had the electrodes at-
tached to himself to verify that what was being done to his prisoners did not exceed
the bounds of humanity. Aussaresses observes that if he had been working the gener-
ator that day, his commandant would have come to a different conclusion.
The interest that Aussaresses’s story holds for most English-speaking readers will
presumably have less to do with Algeria than with the light it purports to shine on the
moral calculus of the “war on terror.” Aussaresses, appearing on the CBS television
program Sixty Minutes, was asked whether, in the framework of a “ticking bomb” sce-
nario, he would torture a suspected terrorist for information. Aussaresses replied that
he believed the answer was obvious, and perhaps so, but then he makes the question
too easy. If a cause is worth the torture of the guilty, why not the innocent? After all,
other forms of military operation accept the baleful necessity of “collateral damage.”
Not the least interesting feature of Aussaresses’s account is his insistence that all of
those he tormented had blood on their hands.
Whatever else one might make of it, this is not the argument of a soldier who suf-
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fers and inºicts injury and death without reference to the personal qualities of his foe.
Aussaresses’s outlook is that of the renegade cop or vigilante, who takes the law into
his own hands because he believes the courts or the “system” will betray him.
Aussaresses does not consider the extent to which the sometimes atrocious conduct of
the French army in Algeria was intended to intimidate the general population, which
French authorities always judged, on scant evidence, to be on the verge of mass up-
heaval. After the war the French would claim to have inºicted 140,000 casualties on
the FLN. Charles de Gaulle, speaking off the cuff, once referred to 200,000 dead,
whereas French intelligence during the war never estimated FLN strength to be higher
than 25,000. The FLN ªnally won because they calculated, correctly, that their own
appalling conduct would inspire a disproportionate and indiscriminate response, the
effect of which on opinion in France and internationally would make the French posi-
tion untenable. Aussaresses ended up on the losing side because he and others like him
agreed to inhabit the moral universe their adversary created. Their conduct, to recall
the words of another smart and devious Frenchman, was worse than a crime. It was a
mistake.
✣ ✣ ✣
Richard Drake. Apostles and Agitators: Italy’s Marxist Revolutionary Tradition. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 273 pp.
Reviewed by Renate Holub, University of California at Berkeley
Many publications in recent decades have focused on the traditions and institutions of
modernity in Europe and North America, but few of these have taken account of It-
aly’s experiences of modernity. A book that focuses on an important strand of moder-
nity’s complex trajectory in Italy, in this case on the Marxist revolutionary tradition, is
therefore bound to enrich a relatively neglected chapter of modern European history.
The task Richard Drake sets for himself is clear: Through a historical examination of
the writings and careers of major Italian Marxist thinkers and activists, he seeks to re-
trace the development of Italy’s Marxist revolutionary tradition. In the eight chapters
of the book, Drake combines biographical data with an analysis of the revolutionary
theories of political activists such as Karl Marx, Carlo Caªero, Antonio Labriola,
Arturo Labriola, Benito Mussolini, Amadeo Bordiga, Antonio Gramsci, and Palmiro
Togliatti. The last three are linked to the development of the Italian Communist Party
(PCI), whereas Mussolini embodies Italian fascism, both philosophically and institu-
tionally. Carlo Caªero represents the link with the theory of anarchism in late nine-
teenth-century Italy, and the two Labriolas were standard-bearers of Italian socialism
before the advent of Communism. What links these various ªgures with Marx is not
so much Marx’s economic analysis and theory of capitalism but a particular aspect of
his political theory, namely, the need for a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” a principle
that inspired the political theories of the revolutionary activists discussed in the book.
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